An Analysis on Lithium Production & Geopolitical Considerations for Bolivia
Demand for lithium has been exploding. Since 2010, demand has increased 4X, and by 2035, demand is expected to grow another 5X, earning lithium the moniker white gold. This growth can be attributed to the green transition, where lithium — with its lightweight and conductive properties — has been a key material in electric vehicle batteries, so much so, Elon Musk called lithium batteries “the new oil.” Moreover, lithium is seen as a geopolitical asset, with the United States identifying it as a national security risk in its rivalry with China.
Bolivia, the poorest nation in South America, has over one-fifth of global lithium resources, making it the world’s largest lithium holder. Yet today, it is producing less than 1% of global supply, largely since current approaches to lithium extraction are uneconomical for Bolivia’s technically challenging deposits. That said, a new technology, Direct Lithium Extraction could change those dynamics, presenting Bolivia with a chance to more than double its GDP growth, and increase investment in the nation.
There is no certainty that Bolivia can create and capture the value of its lithium reserves. From the Spanish Empire pillaging Bolivia’s Potosi region for its silver, to the Global North unearthing fossil fuels from the Global South without investing in local development, resources can yield more extractivism than wealth creation. After all, extractive industries can be exactly that: extractive. This post explores whether Bolivia can become richer from its lithium resources and how meaningful that could be.
The upfront section presents a TLDR version with bullets. Below is a long-form version which elaborates on each of these bullets with additional context, data, and commentary.
TLDR takeaways of lithium production and considerations for Bolivia:
- Lithium is seeing rapid demand growth, riding the wave of the green energy transition, as a key mineral in the batteries of electric vehicles
- Bolivia holds the largest estimated resources of lithium; yet Bolivia is not projected to become a meaningful lithium producer, as resources are not reserves
- Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) is an emerging technology that may unlock the potential to economically extract lithium from Bolivia’s salt flats, though it is untested at scale
- Theoretically, if Bolivia can scale DLE, it could generate flow value of ~$1B / year (highly sensitive to market prices), implying stock asset value of ~$10B
- There is wide (~8X) range to the ~$1B annual estimate, as the price per tonne of lithium has varied meaningfully over the past few years
- While $1B per year may seem diminutive, this can be meaningful for Bolivia’s ~$47B economy, potentially doubling GDP growth
- Furthermore, lithium extraction can fuel economic growth through other indirect means, e.g., the multiplier effect, value chain expansion, investing the new tax revenue, etc.
- At the same time, new resources do not mean greater wealth; if poorly managed, resources can shrink an economy, make it less resilient, and erode democracy
- Currently, there are reasons for concern in the initial steps Bolivia has taken, signing contracts with Chinese companies and failing to meaningfully engage with local communities
- Even if Bolivia can make extraction economically viable with DLE and set up the human, physical, and institutional infrastructure to capture value, it still must address environmental degradation and local buy in
Overall, it’s far from certain that political leadership in Bolivia can navigate these challenges and capture wealth. First, political leadership must make decisions that benefit the country, not just themselves and their cronies — as Maduro has done in Venezuela. Given the weak judicial system, and current state of politics, with rigged elections and jailing of political opponents, it’s unclear Bolivia will have the leadership it needs.
If Bolivia does instill responsible political leadership, it must recognize that partnership is necessary: it does not possess knowledge or assets to independently implement DLE or expand in the electric vehicle battery value chain. In choosing partners, Bolivia should leverage global US-China competition to its benefit. This includes embracing the tailwind of the United States likely paying a premium to nearshore more critical production to the Americas. Bolivia can bolster its bargaining power by embracing deeper regional partnership with its Lithium Triangle neighbors — Chile and Argentina — aiming to agglomerate a local lithium battery ecosystem.
If successful, Bolivia will use the value of its lithium resources to grow its human and institutional resources. A more prosperous Bolivia — and South America — is good for the world. Inclusive economic development reduces poverty and creates pathways for employment outside globally harmful industries such as the drug trade (Bolivia is the third largest cocaine producer behind Colombia and Peru), and human smuggling / trafficking (from the surge of refugees starting in Venezuela and Ecuador). As a democracy, Bolivian’s citizens will ideally decide how to best approach their lithium reserves, but others can help inform and support these decisions.
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Long form analysis:
Lithium is seeing rapid demand growth, riding the wave of the green energy transition, as a key mineral in the batteries of electric vehicles
Green transition: Net zero emissions commitments (many of which are not legally binding) now span over 140 countries and cover close to 90% of global emissions — most with targets to reach this by 2050 or sooner. These commitments have translated into change today: in 2023, a record $1.8 trillion was invested in the low-carbon energy transition, up 17% from the year prior. Within this, electrified transport received $634B (up 36% YoY), surpassing renewable energy as the largest investment segment in low-carbon energy transition projects. Electric vehicles are the primary segment within electrified transport, and the share of global new car sales that are now electric has grown to 14% in 2022, up from 5% in 2020. [1, 2, 3]
Lithium uses: Electric vehicles are driving lithium demand both from the number of new vehicles added, and also since batteries are becoming more lithium dependent. Each car battery has a cathode, whose share of minerals — by volume — has grown to 42% lithium iron phosphate. This share of lithium in the cathode has grown more than 50% since 2020 and eight fold since 2019. By 2030, batteries are expected to account for 95% of lithium demand (the remaining 5% is comprised of ceramics and glass, and greases, powders, polymers, and other industrial uses), and within batteries, mobility applications is expected to be close to 90% of lithium demand in this same time period. [4, 5]
Bolivia holds the largest estimated resources of lithium; yet Bolivia is not projected to become a meaningful lithium producer, as resources are not reserves
Geology of region: Bolivia is part of a resource rich region, a fact it owes to unique geology: around 200 million years ago the volcanic arc formed (which to this day has potentially 200 active volcanoes) yielding magmatism; about 40 million years ago, the Western Andes formed, blocking sediment of this magmatism from eroding to the Pacific ocean; and around 40,000 years ago, the Andean uplift caused several salt lakes in the region to dry. This set of events had led to the region having some of the highest lithium copper, silver, and nitrate concentrations.
Region’s mining history: Mineral mining began in the 1800s with nitrate — used in fertilizer and gunpowder (until Germany invented a new approach in World War I) — ultimately leading to the War of the Pacific which resulted in Bolivia becoming landlocked and regional hostilities to this day (Bolivia still boasts the Navy flag outside government buildings, as a reminder of what can be lost). As part of this, Chile gained territories in the mineral rich Atacama Desert (which culturally, is more similar to the salt flats of Bolivia than the rest of Chile). Now, Chile is the world’s largest producer of copper (producing nearly 2X the next country, Peru), and Peru and Chile are two of the top five silver producers. [5]
Regional resources and production: In terms of lithium, Bolivia is estimated to have the world’s largest resources, at over one-fifth of global supply. The Lithium Triangle — Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile — contains over half of global lithium resources. Today, Chile and Argentina are two of the top four global lithium producers, at 30% and 5% of global production respectively. Nonetheless, Bolivia barely produces any lithium: in 2021, of 100,000 tonnes produced globally, Bolivia contributed 493 tonnes. [7]
Resources vs. Reserves: Part of this discrepancy between large resources and production can be explained by the definitional difference between resources and reserves. Resources, as defined by the US Geological Survey, “comprise all materials, including those only surmised to exist, that have present or anticipated future value.” Reserves are a subset of resources; they have been identified, meet minimum physical and chemical criteria (including grade, quality, thickness, and depth), and can be economically extracted at a given point in time. For Bolivia, it’s not currently economical to extract its lithium resources. [8]
Lithium in Bolivia: Lithium mining in Bolivia is not economical today since it is so technically difficult. While the brine method is most suited for Bolivia, its lithium is less pure than Chile and Argentina, and the salt flats of Bolivia receive more rainfall, working against the evaporation pools. Moreover, there is a deficit of locally skilled labor and insufficient infrastructure. Taken together, early projects to extract lithium via brine pools in Bolivia failed to deliver. [9]
Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) is an emerging technology that may unlock the potential to economically extract lithium from Bolivia’s salt flats, though it is untested at scale
Traditional extraction methods: While lithium isn’t found as a standalone metal in nature, it can be purified from underground sources: hard-rock or brine deposits. Hard rock sources (as in Australia), are extracted using traditional mining techniques in open pit mines. This is cheaper to access but is less pure and therefore less valuable. For brine deposits (as in South America), evaporation pools concentrate lithium and precipitate impurities in what can be a monthslong process. The evaporation method requires 500,000 gallons of water per tonne of lithium, and tends to occur in regions that already have water scarcity. Both processes can contaminate groundwater basins.
Promise of DLE: A new approach, Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) is on the horizon. Relative to traditional extraction methods, DLE requires less land use, can preserve over 98% of the water supply used for extraction, is a faster process, and is not weather dependent. Furthermore, it can extract ~2X the amount of lithium than the traditional evaporation pool method. [10, 11]
Current state of DLE: While DLE seems promising, it has yet to be tested at scale — so feasibility and economics are unproven. Nonetheless, established players such as Albemarle, and SQM, as well as startups are testing the new technology. In the United States, companies are testing applications at the Salton Sea and Great Salt Lake. One of these companies, Lilac — which in February 2024 raised $145M led by Bill Gates’ Breakthrough Energy Ventures — plans to scale production to 20,000 tonnes of annual lithium production by 2027. [12]
Theoretically, if Bolivia can scale DLE, it could generate flow value of ~$1B / year (highly sensitive to market prices), implying stock asset value of ~$10B
Key assumptions: The value of the lithium from mining operations will be dependent on the volume of lithium extracted, and the market prices for lithium at that time. ~$1B / year of lithium extraction assumes Bolivia can scale production to 50,000 tonnes per year, and market prices are $20,000 USD per tonne. The stock value of Bolivia’s lithium reserves assumes a 10% discount rate.
Market prices: The price of lithium carbonate has fluctuated wildly over the past couple years, growing nearly 6X in 2021, and then another 2X in 2022, only to drop 80% from then till now, returning to price ranges more consistent with 2017–2020. However, the downward trend in pricing may not be stabilized; in March 2024, Goldman Sachs 12-month price target for lithium was $10,000, driven by committed mining projects and weakening electric vehicle demand. Furthermore, if Bolivia significantly ramps production, the increased volume could also push down global prices. Given the volatility and importance of lithium pricing on its potential value, supply and demand dynamics are explored further in the section below. [13, 14]
Bolivian production: On volume, any estimates are speculative since they are dependent on a new technology that is untested at scale. Bolivia’s YLB (Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos) — the state company founded in 2017 under the Ministry of Energy responsible for developing the salt falt’s resources, chiefly lithium and potassium salts — announced estimates ranging form 25,000 to 1000,000 tonnes of annual lithium production over the first 6-months of 2023. In January 2024, the YLB estimated Bolivia would reach 15,000 tonnes of production by the end of 2025 from its first industrial scale lithium plant. [15, 16, 17]
Discount rate: To determine a discount rate, market comps across lithium mining extraction projects generally suggest 10% as a typical discount rate. In the United States, most projects use an 8% discount rate, while this tends to be higher in developing countries. A 2019 World Bank investment in a renewable energy project in Bolivia used a 10% discount rate. [18, 19]
There is wide (~8X) range to the ~$1B annual estimate, as the price per tonne of lithium has varied meaningfully over the past few years
Historical volatility: The volatility over the past two years makes it difficult to project future prices: the ~$1B estimate could be halved if prices fall to Goldman Sachs’ 12-month estimate, or increase 4X if prices return to mid-2021 to mid-2023 levels — nearly a 10X swing! To assess factors influencing price, it can be instructive to understand key supply and demand drivers.
Demand dynamics and substitutes: On the demand side, the growth of electric vehicles (EV) will be the most important variable. While there are no credible substitutes for lithium in EV batteries today, there has been substantial investment to find alternatives. Google DeepMind used machine learning to identify 2.2 million new crystals, with the 380,000 most stable as promising candidates for new materials that could “transform batteries.” Microsoft Research screened over 50 million candidate materials to identify a new solid-state electrolyte which can create a battery that requires 70% less lithium. The Chinese automaker JAC Group recently unveiled a sodium-ion battery requiring no lithium. Finally, recycling of lithium batteries can contribute to a larger share of purchased lithium as an increasing number of EV batteries reach end of life each year — a figure expected to reach 7,850 kiltons by 2035. [20, 21, 22, 23]
Global supply dynamics: On the supply side, it’s important to note the long lead time to establishing lithium extraction operations, which is about one year for current approaches. The world’s largest lithium producer, US-based Albemarle, is reducing capital expenditure plans and laid off 30% of its workforce in response to declining lithium prices — even though management believes prices are “unsustainably low.” At the same time, Chinese companies — which in total hold 63% of the lithium market, relative to Albemarle’s 13% — continue to invest ahead of profits, likely functioning more on state orders than market incentives. The willingness of Chinese firms to invest ahead of demand and keep costs low, may lead to a similar market structure for solar cell production, where China has 80% of manufacturing capacity, yet no highly profitable or valuable (by market cap) companies; instead China has geostrategic leverage. [24, 25]
While $1B per year may seem diminutive, this can be meaningful for Bolivia’s ~$47B economy, potentially doubling GDP growth
GDP impact: Bolivia’s GDP was $46.8B in 2023, growing a spiky 3.1% over the past 5 years. Exports drive ~$14B of the economy, with over 50% of exports comprising mineral fuels, ores, and metals. $1B in GDP — which would have been ~$6B at peak 2022 prices — would generate over 2% growth in Bolivia’s economy, increasing the rate of growth by close to 70%.
Relative impact: Of course, while lithium is a valuable resource, it is important to put the value in perspective: white gold (lithium) is not black gold (oil). Guyana, another South American nation, recently discovered it possesses oil resources. Guyana’s GDP was ~$8B in 2021 (with a population less than 1/10th that of Bolivia), and is expected to generate oil production to ~$8B per year by 2040. [26, 27]
Furthermore, lithium extraction can fuel economic growth through other indirect means, e.g., the multiplier effect, value chain expansion, investing the new tax revenue, etc.
Multiplier effect: There are many mechanisms and approaches by which Bolivia can generate value from its lithium beyond the mining itself. First, local citizens will improve their salaries, increasing the amount they can spend on other goods and services, stimulating the whole economy through a multiplier effect.
Infrastructure benefits: Second, investment in public infrastructure — airports, roads, water, sewage, electricity — should improve transportation, health outcomes, and productive opportunities for those in the region. Furthermore, better infrastructure could improve tourism. Lithium deposits are concentrated in the Uyuni Salt Flats, which are a top driver for international tourists to Bolivia (tourism was ~3.5% of Bolivia’s economy in 2021). Of course, seeing mining operations in the background of the pristine horizonless salt fields could also have a negative impact on tourism.
Value chain expansion: Third, Bolivia can expand in the value chain beyond mining for lithium. While the lithium mining market generated $5.7B in 2023, McKinsey predicts the battery value chain will grow tenfold to over $400B in annual revenue by 2030. Moving into refining or manufacturing can be higher margin and less volatile areas to build capabilities in. [28]
Labor force upskilling: Fourth, local workers will improve their professional skills through training and education. These can ideally be transferable across companies and perhaps even industries, improving the robustness and resilience of the economy over time, and if new companies and industries are attracted, perhaps even creating agglomeration economics.
Government investment: Finally, Bolivia can also grow its economy through effective investment of the new tax revenue generated from extraction. In fact, Bolivia has experience managing a resource that has comprised a large share of its GDP — natural gas. In 2013, revenue from hydrocarbons (primarily natural gas) stood at 24% of GDP. Through a tax on these hydrocarbons, Bolivia funded a generous social safety net program, which lifted one-quarter of its residents out of poverty, and reduced extreme poverty by one-half. In 2022, natural gas production stood at 6.5% of GDP, which to be fair, is still Bolivia’s main source of income, above mining or agricultural sectors. [29, 30, 31]
Role of government: Effectively managing resource wealth is critical for Bolivia’s stage of development, especially in the context of being part of such a mineral-rich region. Done effectively, Bolivia can leverage its resources to expand into more valuable parts of the value chain (e.g., refining, manufacturing) while building up its public infrastructure. Simultaneously, given a lack of technical expertise, Bolivia must work with foreign companies, which will also compete to capture the surplus value. Of course, even if successful, heavy reliance on a single resource is a risk, so the government should ensure it is able to invest in other industries and ideally has a safety net / wealth fund for downturns.
At the same time, new resources do not mean greater wealth; if poorly managed, resources can shrink an economy, make it less resilient, and erode democracy
Venezuela case study: Counterintuitively, resources can reduce the size of an economy. In Venezuela (where oil comprises 95% of exports, 66% of government receipts, and 25% of GDP), GDP shrank by three-quarters between 2014 and 2021. While this is highly influenced by commodity prices, political leadership may be an even more fundamental factor. Leaders that tighten their grip on power and resort to crony capitalism can harvest the resources of a nation in the short term, extracting wealth for themselves, and leaving the populace worse off. [32]
The resource curse: Nonetheless, even if leaders are well intentioned, newfound resources still create dynamics which can strain a local economy. First, the Dutch Disease / Resource Curse makes domestic production of other goods less competitive on global markets, as currency appreciates and all marginal investment is dedicated toward the new resource. This distorts economic development, impeding industrialization in other sectors, and makes the economy less resilient. Second, democratic backsliding is more likely since the government relies less on public tax receipts as its primary source of revenue — making public opinion and income less important for government funding.
Role of political leadership: Political leadership is key to ensuring a country can navigate these challenges and promote sustainable economic growth. One template is the February 2024 UN resolution submitted by several African nations to promote the “sustainable use of transitional metals” and avoid the injustices and extractivism” of how fossil fuel resources were managed. As part of this, these nations are imposing export bans on raw metals to promote local technology transfers, workforce skills, and production capacities, which requires coordination with other mineral-rich countries to avoid a prisoner’s dilemma. For Bolivia, a starting point would be to partner with its neighbors Argentina and Chile, acknowledging some tensions still remain dating to the War of the Pacific. [33]
Currently, there are reasons for concern in the initial steps Bolivia has taken, signing contracts with Chinese companies and failing to meaningfully engage with local communities
Current contracts: Bolivia politics, especially while under Evo Morales, expresses a strong anti-Imperialist rhetoric, and distaste for the West (i.e. United States). In this context, Bolivia signed a contract with a Chinese company, CBC (mostly owned by the Chinese EV battery maker CATL) in January 2023 to invest $1B in Bolivia to extract lithium. While it’s unclear how this partnership will evolve, precedent does not bode well for Bolivia’s ability to capture value beyond extraction. Chinese companies are agents for the Chinese state, which has identified processing of rare earth metals as a strategic capability (China processes over half of the world’s lithium today). As such, it’s unlikely CBC will support refining of lithium in Bolivia. Furthermore, Chinese development projects in foreign countries (funded through the Belt and Road Initiative) staff projects with Chinese laborers and procure materials from Chinese suppliers; this limits the multiplier effect, skills transfer, and benefit for local businesses of the host country.
Local protests: The local communities in the salt flat region of Potosi tend to be indigenous, and have already criticized the lack of transparency in the company selection process that the government has led. As a result these indigenous communities have blocked past projects — such as one scheduled with Germany — and have protested and blocked the development of lithium processing plants as recently as 2023, demanding a greater share of the economic value of extraction. This is relative to Argentina, where the lithium mining decisions are put in the hands of the regional governments (vs. the federal government). While the primary focus for Potosi residents is on securing a greater share of the wealth creation, there is also concern about the risk to water security and environmental degradation. [34, 35]
Even if Bolivia can make extraction economically viable with DLE and set up the human, physical, and institutional infrastructure to capture value, it still must address environmental degradation and local buy in
Historical risks: Not only can resources be damaging to national economies, they can also be destructive to local communities. Precedent shows how local communities — disproportionately Indigenous — are impacted by environmental destruction (from mining to waste disposal activities) which impacts biodiversity, water supply, and the health of local citizens. If this alone doesn’t drive displacement, extrajudicial violence — often by state or private security forces supporting large international corporations — can force communities off their property, or even kill them (as seen in Peru with its copper mines). [36]
Environmental harm: One issue is environmental degradation. Likely a second thought to extractive industries, environmental degradation is seen across both brine pools and hard rock mining projects. For instance, Chinese companies, using brine pools in Tibet, leaked toxic chemicals, including hydrochloric acid into the water table, killing fish in the rivers and polluting drinking wells. In hard rock mining, there is runoff of the toxic chemicals used; in Nevada, fish were impacted 150 miles downstream from mining operations, and in Chile canals in the mountains are filled with water that has an unnatural blue hue. [37, 38]
Cultural buy-in: An anecdotal survey of local villagers in Tibet suggested that locals there would oppose future mining projects even if profits were shared with them: “God is in the mountains and the rivers, these are the places that spirits live. When mining comes and the grassland is dug up, people believe worse disasters will come. It destroys the mountain god.” Similarly in Bolivia, Pachamama, or Mother Earth, represents the earth’s fertility and is the goddess Bolivian’s pray to and worship. As such, by harming the earth, environmental degradation from lithium extraction is an assault to Bolivian beliefs and culture. Unless more environmentally friendly methods are used, locals may continue to resist expansion of these operations.
Green premium?: At the same time, the belief system and cultural norms of Bolivia’s people can be an asset. Mining is an extractive industry, which by definition “withdraws resources with no provision for replenishment.” This is counter to the relationship Bolivians have with Pachamama and the natural world. By promoting and enforcing better mining standards with less environmental degradation, Bolivia can lead the charge of ensuring the means to a green transition are green themselves. In doing so, it is positioned to capture a green premium above global commodity pricing, and be at the forefront of a trend toward more responsible and sustainable industry.
To conclude, there is no inherent biological reason why, on average, a person born in the United States will create 20X more economic value than someone born in Bolivia (measured by GDP / capita). Just like China, Bolivia should aspire to create conditions to promote foreign investment in infrastructure and building capacity of Bolivia’s industry, and close the gap between the economic capacity of large nations and itself. Lithium could be the bargaining chip that makes that possible.
Sources:
[1] Net Zero Coalition, United Nations
[2] BloombergNEF, January 2024
[3] EV Outlook 2023, IEA
[4] Nathaniel Bullard
[5] McKinsey: How Battery Makers Can Respond to Surging Demand for EVs (October 2022)
[6] Statista Copper production by country
[7] US Geological Survey, 2024 Lithium
[8] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024
[9] Reuters: Lithium Riches in Bolivia’s Salt Flats May Still Just Be Mirage (May 2022)
[10] CSIS: South America’s Lithium Triangle Opportunities (August 2021)[11] Darcy Partners: An Intro to Direct Lithium Extraction (March 2023)
[12] Wall Street Journal: The Great Salt Lake is Full of Lithium (February 2024)
[13] Trading Economics
[14] Financial Review: Lithium Bear Market Far From Over (March 2024)
[15] Mining.com: Bolivia Uyuni Plant to Yield First Lithium by 2025 end (January 2024)
[16] Aljazeera: Bolivia Taps China, Russia in Bid to Unlock Lithium Riches (June 2023)
[17] Nikkei Asia: China Consortium to Develop Lithium Deposits in Bolivia (January 2023)
[18] S&P Global: Lithium Supply Race — Delayed Hope in 2024 (January 2023)
[19] World Bank Bolivia Renewable Energy Project
[20] DeepMind Press Release (November 2023)
[21] Microsoft Press Release (January 2024)
[22] Yahoo News: Chinese Company Unveils Revolutionary Sodium Ion Battery (September 2023)
[23] McKinsey: Battery Recycling Takes the Driver’s Seat (March 2023)
[24] Financial Times: Albemarle warns of losing lithium market share to China as prices fall (November 2023)
[25] Financial Times: Top lithium producer Albemarle downgrades 2030 demand forecast as EV shift slows (February 2024)
[26] Focus Economics
[27] IMF
[28] Nasdaq: Lithium Market 2023 Year End Review (February 2024)
[29] Hurriyet Daily News: Bolivia Running Out of Natural Gas (September 2023)
[30] Center for Global Development: Bolivia’s Antipoverty Successes Are Going to Face Funding Challenges (November 2019)
[31] Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America (2019)
[32] Council on Foreign Relations: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate (December 2023)
[33] The Guardian: African Leaders Call for Equity over Minerals Used for Clean Energy (February 2024)
[34] Reuters: In Bolivia’s heartland, protests rattle lithium development push (March 2023)
[35] Wall Street Journal: China spends billions on risky bets to lockdown world’s lithium (May 2023)
[36] World Politics Review: Africa Minerals Extractivism (March 2024)
[37] Wired: The spiraling environmental cost of our lithium battery addiction (August 2018)
[38] Washington Post: Tibetans in anguish as Chinese mines pollute their sacred grasslands (December 2016)
Resources for further reading:
- World Politics Review: The Green Energy Transition Has an Extractivism Problem (2022)
- Lithium extractivism and water injustices in the Salar de Atacama, Chile: The colonial shadow of green electromobility (2021)
