A Perspective on China: 3 Mindsets for Americans

With each passing year, media coverage of China seems to only increase. 2022 started with China announcing greater alignment with Russia, shortly before the Ukraine invasion, prompting concerns for the independence of Taiwan (and semiconductor resilience), heightened during PLA military drills post Pelosi visit, all surrounded by Top Gun Maverick fervor. By the fall, coverage shifted to President Xi’s “reelection” and sweeping semiconductor export restrictions to China. Now we’re seeing the Western portrayal of the PRC’s drastic and dramatic policy shift on COVID.

Our mindshare toward China is likely only to increase, as China now joins the US as a global leader and meaningful systems competitor. In this context, and as an American, I write this post to elucidate three mindsets that I encourage Americans to adopt as we grow our perspective on China. To be sure, my views on many of these topics are dynamic; they are not truths, but rather thoughts intended to grapple with, ultimately helping you challenge and form your beliefs, and thereby perspective and questions.

Mindset 1: Do not villainize the other side — or use it as a scapegoat

This may seem obvious, but sadly, anti-Chinese rhetoric has grown America (and anti-Western rhetoric in China), fueled by the rise of nationalism in both nations [1]. In the last decade, the US has witnessed a sweeping bipartisan shift across the political, academic, and business communities. This shift has been accompanied by antagonistic rhetoric, such as calling COVID-19 the China Virus; more biased reporting, even bleeding to reputable publications like the NYT; and anti-Asian racism that has sadly resulted in violence. The antidote of human-to-human connections has been drastically hampered with reduced academic ties, business integration, and travel between the two nations.

Most important, straightforward, and forgotten is that we should not villainize the Chinese people. The people are not the state, and we should not conflate them as such. This was a trap I found myself in back in 2015 when viewing Russia. At the time, I perceived the nation as the Cold War loser run by a sordid dictator. I was fortunate my ex-girlfriend broadened my awareness and perspective by teaching me about Russia’s rich history and culture. I learned that the Russians living in Russia can be welcoming and fun, giving little mindshare or support for the state. After all, being American does not make me Donald Trump. I’m fortunate to have friends that live in China; friends that have shared their frustration and sadness during lockdowns; hopes and fears during protests; and joy from being close to friends, family, and familiar places. However, I realize most Americans do not have friends that live in China, and as such, it’s easy for Western news headlines to become the full representation of the Chinese people.

Turning to the top, neither should we villainize President Xi [2]. To be clear, I do not agree with many of President Xi’s policies (partly because of morals, partly because they are competitive with the US [3]). At the same time, we must balance this perspective with President Xi’s track record– more than doubling the size of the economy, lifting tens of millions out of poverty, and establishing China as a leader in telecom amongst other industries. While Xi’s approaches may seem at times inhumane to us in the West, we are poignantly reminded in The Third Body Problem that it is “easy to make ideological mistakes in theory.” We must remember Asian culture prioritizes “the group more than the individual, order more than argument, authority more than liberty, and solidarity more than freedom.” We do not need to agree with his objectives or methods; but we should not view him as a villain.

Let me now turn to the second part of this mindset: do not use China as a scapegoat. This summer at my family reunion, someone said “I’ll tell you; it doesn’t make one difference what we do with regards to climate if the China doesn’t clean up its act first.” This statement is flawed for many reasons [4], but I was most struck by how China was being held up as a reason for why the US — and us as individuals — should not lead. China’s actions should not justify cowering from pursuing progress or doing the right thing.

I’ll conclude this section with one theory for how we got here (and potential solution!). As part of an HBS US-China seminar, our class guest Dan Wang discussed the power of media portrayals. Korea and Japan created cultural arts that transcended their borders and resonated with the West. On the other hand, China’s film and television industry, with censorship restrictions and a large enough domestic market, failed to produce many cultural exports (Three Body Problem as an exception), potentially limiting the sort of “love and curiosity” media can create for different cultures. Media can be a powerful tool for building empathy, so I hope we see more authentically Chinese stories told at scale here in America.

Mindset 2: Competition is good — for the world, and for us

China’s ascendency is challenging US hegemony, leading to the first great power competition since the Cold War. At first, more competition may not seem like a positive for Americans; however, turning briefly to business school theory on market structures, monopolies are bad! Competition can accelerate innovation and is often better for workers, consumers, and industry partners. These dynamics also apply to nation-states! While a near monopoly status has benefited Americans (monopolies can extract higher profits!) [5], it’s unclear if we have benefitted us on the net [6]. Bringing this back to business school: is it better to have a larger share of a smaller pie, or a smaller share of a larger pie? [7]

China’s rise has created more opportunities for the rest of the world, and a burning platform for Americans at home. Globally, nations have been able to fund more large-scale infrastructure projects at better terms [8]; secure access to COVID-19 vaccines before Western nations would supply them; and deploy better and less expensive telecom offerings [9]. At home in the US, we have made strides in promoting semiconductor resilience, passed landmark climate legislation, and finalized much needed infrastructure projects. These were passed using rhetoric and framing that we have not seen to this degree since the Cold War. China may have invigorated the national spirit in the US.

Of course, as an American, I want America to win this competition. The implications of a stronger China are weaker individual liberties and free speech across the world. That said, as a nation that prizes free-markets, we should embrace this competition. Practically, this mindset is about shifting from the refrain that we need to “prevent China’s rise” to one where we need to “outcompete a strong rival.” Tactically, this means we should not be “confrontational without being competitive.” Idealistically, we could be competitive without being confrontational, more akin to the Olympics. And if we do this, I think we all stand to benefit; after all, the last great power competition propelled the invention of the internet, satellites, and GPS — technologies that America has disproportionally benefitted from.

To be sure, competition is only beneficial if it remains cold; preventing a war is paramount. Red lines, a concept championed by former Australian PM Kevin Rudd, can be key to this. What’s tough is these aren’t likely to be made public [10], so we don’t have a strong sense for whether they exist or how they are defined (though the November Biden-Xi Meeting seems like a positive sign they are being discussed). It’s clear the most contentious topic between the US and China is related to Taiwan; fortunately, any imminent Chinese militaristic invasion is unlikely [11]. That said, with military aircraft flying within 10 feet of each other and increased cyber-attacks and espionage, it’s possible that one relatively small action can quickly escalate tensions. It’s up to both governments to set up the rules of the game, and then follow them, so this does not happen.

Mindset 3: We have enormous mutual interest — and should work together

Let’s not forget that the US and China had an incredibly mutually beneficial multi-decade relationship. China grew its economy at the fastest pace in history, and the United States (and rest of world) benefitted from lower cost goods and increasing wealth / buying power. The conventional wisdom that China would eventually need to adapt to Western values to sustain its growth proved wrong, enabling the CCP’s continued rise without Western values. While partnership can be difficult when values do not align, both sides will be more effective within their own borders and distinct value systems if they work together in a few — huge! — areas.

The first area is the global economy — both sides benefit from stability and growth. Food security is a key tenant for stability, raising concerns about Russia/Ukraine grain exports. In areas like this, the US and China should work together to broker peaceful resolutions that continue to nourish free and open trade.

Second is global health. Neither nation benefited from COVID-19, and both are incentivized to preempt any future pandemics. To be clear, China’s reopening strategy (unleashing general contagion and potentially new variants) and its dearth of reporting does not bode well on the current status here.

Third is climate change. Both nations are bearing ramifications of human-caused climate change [12] — including worsening floods, heat waves, and dust storms in China. Not only should both nations drive climate progress within their own borders, they should work together to establish standards across the globe.

To be clear, these areas benefit from a different approach than the one outlined in competition. Whereas competition relies on red lines, here we are more in need of “circles” — collective domains where common goals and accountability measures are established, working groups are formed, and data and research are openly shared. Whereas competition can exist in two walled gardens, these areas require significant communication and multilateral coordination.

That said, these areas of mutual interest can unfortunately be conflated with competition-based decisions (e.g., export bans or tariffs) and used as bargaining chips in broader political stratagems. Instead of letting competition blind us to mutual interest, an ideal world would harness this mutual interest to build greater trust in the system / rules we build for our competition.

To conclude, these mindsets are not meant to be mutually exclusive or perfectly clear. This is the real world, so things are messier than theory. They are meant to be guiding principles to “try on” as you read an article, have a conversation, or consider some domestic policy related to China. After all, these articles, conversations, and policy decisions are only increasing.

[1] In China, this is more pronounced in younger generations, which is concerning for future US-China relations, but also not surprising given they have grown up during an era of extraordinary economic growth and stronger media censorship.

[2] This is not a blanket statement for all state leaders; I believe it’s absolutely permissible to villainize Putin, for instance. Moreover, I write this as an American; if you were Taiwanese, this label may be more apt.

[3] My favorite description of Xi’s strategic blunder here is that he was just like a adversary from a James Bond film, revealing his master-plan (to displace need of import trading partners through dual circulation) too early.

[4] To start, the US is the second largest annual emitter by a longshot, and by far the largest cumulative emitter in history.

[5] One way we directly benefited was through inflated demand for the dollar since it was used as a global reserve; this ultimately strengthened the USD, thereby subsidizing all our lifestyles.

[6] To be sure, America successfully fostered a thriving technology sector and has continued to respond well to crises (e.g., developing COVID-19 vaccines).

[7] While seemingly simple to answer (how large is the total pie, and what is the share in both instances), there are many assumptions that make this difficult to ever know. Plus, there are many non-economic factors (happiness, health outcomes, educational attainment) to consider as well.

[8] We were struck that even Zanzibar sported soccer stadiums built by the Chinese (one aptly named Mao Zedong stadium).

[9] Of course there are tradeoffs if the CCP decides to use this chokepoint to moderate or block content against a nation’s will, in effect imposing a form of digital colonialism.

[10] Domestically, having public red lines would be fodder for the opposing political party; broadly, making these public would orient folks around how far the envelope can be pushed.

[11] A Chinese militaristic invasion of Taiwan would likely wipe out supply of leading-edge semiconductors (fabs are expensive to build, and easy to destroy), crushing the global economy — China included. Xi hopes to change this calculus by building Mainland China’s own design and manufacture capabilities, but are at minimum 3 years away (likely further with new export bans). Furthermore, any surprise strike is unlikely, as the PLA will likely want to build up its Navy presence off the coast, a process that can take one year. That said, it’s very likely Xi wants to see reunification under his reign.

[12] This is not true for all nations. Russia, for instance, has a positive cost of social carbon, meaning it benefits from the changing climate — as it will have more arable (and livable) land, and increased trade opportunities via opening Arctic passageways.

If you liked this, you can find similar pieces of Generative AI and Climate. Special thanks to Jon Ma and Chris Lipcsei for encouraging me to write these.